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The past 2 years have witnessed an 
intense national and international de-
bate over major issues in the law of the 
sea. The legal questions connected with 
man's increasing desire to exploit the 
living and mineral resources of the seas 
and ocean floor have occasioned par-
ticular interest both domestically and 
abroad. 
At home several bodies, which I will 
mention later, have devoted their activi-
ties to these questions. Internationally, 
the increased activities of the Inter-
governmental Oceanographic Commis-
sion (IOC) and Intergovernmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization (1M CO) 
have been supplemented by debates at 
the 22nd Session of the General Assem-
bly which resulted in a new 3S-nation 
United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Seabeds. The United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly will again address these 
problems this fall. Indeed, each week 
brings a report of new scientific or 
commercial interest in the resources of 
the sea and ocean floor. The imagina-
tion of Jules Verne 100 years ago in 
Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the 
Sea is finally being outstripped by ac-
tual technology. The future is projected 
in the context of scientific research and 
technology infinitely more exciting than 
the literary entertainment of science 
fiction. Using the commonly accepted 
U.S. measure of importance-the al-
mighty dollar-it is reported that 
current economic activity in just that 
portion of the sea area known as the 
Continental Shelf is in the magnitude of 
multibillions of dollars. 
The dramatic increase in the national 
and international efforts being made in 
this area directly reflects the increased 
attention being focused on the Conti-
nental Shelf and deep ocean floor by 
previously disinterested nations. This 
increased interest and involvement 
carries important implications for many 
of the Navy's ocean-based activities. 
If the deliberations on near shore and 
deep ocean seabed problems could be 
described in a single word, that word 
would be diversity; diversity of desires, 
of technological capabilities, and of 
expectations. In addition to navigational 
and related uses, the ocean waters and 
the bed of the sea are now commercially 
producing oil and gas, salt, bromine, 
magnesium, sulphur, and other minerals, 
not to mention the vast variety of 
products of the fishing industry. It is 
not surprising that legal principles 
proposed for this new frontier are as 
numerous and divergent as its material 
potential. 
There are numerous national posi-
tions as to the importance and priority 
to be attached to the establishment of 
246 
legal principles in the ocean environ-
ment Thus, it has unquestionably be-
come an arena in which private and 
governmental interest is generating pres-
sure for development and legal change. 
Domestically such pressures resulted 
in passage of the Marine Resources and 
Engineering Development Act in 1966. 
This act established a Cabinet-level Na-
tional Council on Marine Resources and 
Engineering Development and a Com-
mission on Marine Science, Engineering 
and Resources. The Navy, from the 
Secretarial level down, has played a 
major role in the deliberations of the 
Council, Commission, and the many 
subordinated interagency working 
bodies established under them. The 
Office of the Judge Advocate General 
has been consulted more and more 
frequently as the legal facets of techno-
logical and scientific problems became 
apparent 
While the National Council and the 
Commission has focused primarily on 
the long-range needs of a national 
oceanographic program, there has been 
a dramatic increase in the tempo of 
ocean-oriented activities at all levels of 
the U.S. Government New international 
involvement in the area of ocean-
ography is well illustrated by the resolu-
tion introduced by Malta at the United 
Nations in the summer of 1967. This 
resolution proposed restricting use of 
the seabed to peaceful purposes and 
establishment of a legal regime which 
would insure that the proceeds of deep 
ocean mineral wealth would be used to 
aid developing countries. 
This and other proposals pointed up 
the need in the U.S. Government for a 
high-level permanent interagency com-
mittee which could focus on the day-
to-day problems of preparing and pre-
senting U.S. positions in relation to the 
Continental Shelf and deep ocean floors 
in various international forums. This 
need was met this past February by the 
creation of the Interagency Committee 
on International Policy in the Marine 
Environment under the chairmanship of 
the Deputy Under-Secretary of State. 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research and Development) is the De-
partment of Defense representative on 
this committee. 
The Continental Shelf and deep 
ocean floor questions required immedi-
ate attention by the new Interagency 
Committee both because of the ongoing 
meetings of the United Nations Com-
mittee on the Seabeds, which was estab-
lished following the Malta resolution, 
and because numerous private groups 
and Government agencies were urgently 
seeking clarification of the jurisdictional 
limits of the U.S. Continental Shelf. 
Accordingly, a Working Group on the 
Shelf and Deep Ocean Floor, abbrevi-
ated as SADOF, was established. I have 
been privileged to be appointed the 
Department of Defense representative 
on this working group. 
The active role played by the Depart-
ment of Defense, and particularly the 
Navy, in the long-range studies and 
policy planning work of the National 
Council, the Commission, and the Inter-
agency Committee is surprising and dis-
turbing to some. This reaction is based 
on the fact that most of the broad range 
of oceanographic problems concerns 
civil or peaceful uses of the oceanic 
environment, with particular emphasis 
on the extraction of its mineral and 
living resources. There are, however, 
several good reasons for the interest and 
concern of the Department of Defense 
and, in particular, the Navy. 
First, the Navy manages numerous 
programs which have potential civilian 
as well as military applications. Its 
well-known Man-in-the-Sea program 
alone is developing numerous new tech· 
niques useful in many phases of the 
offshore oil industry. In fact, the Navy 
spends approximately half of all govern-
mental monies available within the 
United States for scientific research and 
technology development which have 
oceanic applications. 
Second, it is-reasonable to assume 
that the military will play an important 
role in affording protection to U.S. 
citizens and to their personal property 
that may be placed on the seabed of the 
Continental Shelf, or beyond, to be 
used in scientific or extractive opera-
tions. It is important, therefore, for the 
Department of Defense to understand 
the needs and rights of such operators 
so that the protection afforded will be 
both reasonable and lawful and thus 
minimize the risk of conflict. 
The third reason for our interest is 
that it is important that modes of 
accommodation be developed to insure 
that military activities do not unreason-
ably interfere with new usages or im-
pede future progress made possible 
through new technology. Already, new 
means of coordinating oil drilling opera-
tions and Navy weapons testing along 
the California coast have been found. 
The fourth and most compelling rea-
son for the Navy's direct interest and 
concern with these developments is that 
implementation of many proposals 
would create an implicit acceptance of 
additional constraints and controls on 
military activities. Proposals which 
would, on the one hand, increase na-
tional jurisdiction over coastal waters, in 
a qualitative or quantitative sense, or, 
on the other hand, place the seabed of 
the deep oceans under the control of an 
international agency could have a sig-
nificant impact on the historic principle 
of freedom of the seas. It is of particular 
importance to avoid arrangements 
which would result in the degradation 
of the right of warships and submarines 
to navigate on and under the high seas. 
Any arrangements-if they are to be 
reflective of our overall national inter-
ests-must recognize that the oceans are, 
and will continue to be, vital to our 
national security. 
Thus, Navy participation in our na-
tional deliberations has been considered 
both necessary and desirable to ensure 
that national security interests are fully 
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considered in the course of developing 
both long-range criteria and immediate 
policy initiatives. 
During the past year it has become 
increasingly clear that fundamental 
issues of international law of the sea are 
intertwined with and underlie the devel-
opment of a comprehensive oceano-
graphic program. Virtually all arrange-
ments being discussed either rely on or 
modify historic principles of interna-
tional law. Accordingly, the lawyers 
within the various agencies have played 
an increasingly active role in the con-
sideration of these issues. 
The most immediate area of interest 
to international lawyers is the Conti-
nental Shelf. This area, in geological 
terms, is the extension of the continen-
tal mass which gently slopes out from 
the world's coasts. It extends in some 
places further than 200 miles before a 
sudden break in grade, normally located 
at about the 200-meter depth curve, 
plunges into the deep ocean abyss. The 
Continental Shelf is most easily acces-
sible to man's developing marine tech-
nology; and lawyers are now compelled 
to consider its legal status by the bur-
geoning commercial and scientific 
activity made possible by its relatively 
shallow superadjacent waters. 
The Shelf and Deep Ocean Floor 
Working Group referred to previously 
which, by the way, is composed pri-
marily of lawyers, is presently engaged 
in developing recommendations on two 
fundamental questions of mixed policy 
and law. One is the question of how and 
where the outer limit of the regime of 
the Continental Shelf should be further 
delineated. The second is what type of 
legal regime should be negotiated re-
garding the ocean seabed and its re-
sources beyond the outer limit of the 
Continental Shelf. 
President Truman initiated the Conti-
nental Shelf regime in 1945 when he 
unilaterally proclaimed that the United 
States would exercise exclusive jurisdic-
tion and control over the natural re-
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sources of the seabed and subsoil of our 
adjacent Continental Shelf. In a press 
release which accompanied the Truman 
Proclamation, the area was described as 
including all of the ocean floor "con-
tiguous to" the coasts of the United 
States to a depth of 600 feet-which is 
approximately 200 meters. 
A mere 13 years later the Continen-
tal Shelf regime was codified by the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf. The Convention, however, 
describes the outer boundary of the 
regime in somewhat less than precise 
terms. 
Article 1 provides that the term 
"Continental Shelf" refers to the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas 
adjacent to the coasts but outside the 
area of the territorial sea to a depth of 
200 meters or, beyond that limit, to 
where the depth of the superadjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the said areas. Thus 
the Continental Shelf regime becomes 
applicable beyond the 200 meter iso-
bath as new technology such as new 
types of Texas Towers or even com-
pletely submerged installations allows 
commercial extraction of oil and gas 
resources at greater depths. This, of 
course, is an open ended definition-
depth of 200 meters or depth of ex-
ploitability . 
The exploitability test does not meet 
the normal legal requirements of cer-
tainty. However, it does have the advan-
tage of flexibility and makes the Con-
vention applicable without change to 
future situations brought about by new 
technology. Of course, this second cri-
terion tends to make the scope of the 
Convention ambiguous and has already 
created heated discussions and divergent 
views among international lawyers. 
As the U.S. Department of Interior 
has already leased areas beyond the 200 
meter isobath, the question of the per-
missible scope of the exploitability test 
is no longer academic. Considering the 
emerging technological capabilities 
possessed by the United States and 
other leading maritime powers and the 
fact that the Convention by its own 
terms is open for amendment in 1969, 
the Department of Defense has agreed 
that the question should be examined as 
to how the rather vague exploitability 
criterion should be modified. Accord-
ingly, the United States tabled several 
months ago a proposal before the 
United Nations Committee on the 
Seabeds that there should be established 
as soon as practicable an internationally 
agreed, precise boundary between the 
deep ocean floor and the regime of the 
Continental Shelf. This, then, is the 
basis for urgency behind the first of the 
specific tasks assigned to the Working 
Group on the Shelf and Deep Ocean 
Floor-to develop a recommended U.S. 
position on the question of how the 
Continental Shelf outer boundary 
should be established and where it 
should be. 
At least four "legal" issues are basic 
to an evaluation of the relative de-
sirability of various proposed outer 
boundaries, and the working group de-
liberations have revolved around these 
issues to date. 
The first is an examination of the 
qualitative nature of the present Conti-
nental Shelf regime. That is, what rights 
and duties does the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf impose upon a nation 
possessing a Continental Shelf, and do 
these rights and duties apply to non-
signatory nations? Numerous questions 
remain under the Convention regarding 
types of allowable scientific research 
activities and other matters. The de-
sirability of an outer boundary formula 
which produces a broad Continental 
Shelf depends, for a maritime nation 
with worldwide interests such as the 
United States, in large part upon the 
types of activities on and over the shelf 
regime which can be regulated and how 
they can be regulated. In this regard the 
relevancy of applicable domestic legisla-
tion must also be determined. 
Closely related to this question is the 
effect which the location of a boundary 
will have on traditional freedoms of the 
sea exercised either within the waters 
over the shelf or outside the new bound-
ary. What types of new limitations on 
transits by surface vessels will develop, 
for example? The establishment of a 
precise boundary in and of itself might 
stimulate nations to increase the degree 
of control they exercise over events 
landward of that boundary, but it might 
also tend to insure that events seaward 
of the boundary were protected from at 
least some types of claims to national 
jurisdiction. 
Thirdly, what impact will the bound-
ary have on the difficulties or chances 
of effectuating a satisfactory regime for 
the exploitation of the resources be-
yond the boundary? If the boundary is 
far seaward, for example, there are few 
known resources whose exploitation 
would be affected by a deep ocean 
regime in the near future. 
Finally, by what methods or pro-
cedures may the boundary be changed? 
Is it possible, in other words, to estab-
lish a precise boundary through inter-
pretation of the Shclf Convention, or is 
further legislation or a new treaty neces-
sary to alter the status quo? In this 
regard it should be noted that though 
there is little specific reference to how 
far and how deep the shelf regime could 
extend under the exploitability criterion 
in the 1958 Convention working docu-
ments and debates, it would seem that 
the exploitability test of the Convention 
is, in fact, limited by the requirement of 
reasonable proximity to the coast and 
reasonable relationship to the geologic 
Continental Shelf. 
The question as to what the most 
desirable limit should be-from the 
standpoint of national security-is a 
complex one. The qualitative nature of 
lawful restrictions upon military activi-
ties sought to be undertaken on a 
foreign Continental Shelf are not yet 
clearly defined. It is clear, however, that 
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military activities may not be under-
taken on or above a foreign shelf which 
would interfere with that nation's right 
to explore its shelf or exploit its re-
sources. , 
The Navy is presently examining the 
military implications of various pro-
posals for specific outer limits. These 
proposals range from 200 meters to 
4,000 meters in depth and from 50 
miles to 200 miles from shore or a 
combination of both depth and distance 
criteria. Without attempting to prejudge 
the conclusion of these Navy studies 
and the work of SAD OF, the general 
conclusion appears warranted that a 
relatively narrow Continental Shelf 
regime would best serve the security 
interests of the United States. The 
conclusion that our military interests 
are best served by a restrictive definition 
is to a considerable extent, however, 
based upon the nature of an agreed deep 
ocean regime that will evolve beyond 
the Continental Shelf. 
Our SADOF Working Group has also 
been tasked to develop recommenda-
tions regarding a regime for the deep 
oceans beyond the Continental Shelf. In 
this connection the United States re-
cently tabled at the U.N. Committee on 
the Seabeds certain basic principles to 
be used as a basis for internationally 
agreed arrangements for the exploita-
tion and use by states of the deep ocean 
floor and its subsoil. The fundamental 
principle proposed was that no state 
may claim or exercise sovereign rights 
over any part of the deep ocean floor. 
This is not to say that the explora-
tion and use of the deep ocean floor or 
the exploitation of its resources are 
prohibited. The deep ocean floor may 
be used for 'nonmilitary or military 
activities under existing principles of 
international law pursuant to the con-
cept of the freedom of the seas-
recognizing, of course, that reasonable 
regard must be given to the interest of 
other states in their exercise of high seas 
freedoms. In addition, there is agree-
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ment among most international lawyers 
that minerals lying beyond the regime 
of the Continental Shelf may be law-
fully exploited, and the exploiter is 
entitled to keep what he finds. 
A question does exist, however, as to 
whether an individual or nation may 
claim some form of interest in areas 
adjacent to an exploitative activity and, 
if so, how large such areas can be. In 
this regard it is reasonable to conclude 
that in the not too distant future, 
clarification of such rights will be neces-
sary in order to render deep ocean 
exploitative operations both feasible 
and profitable. 
The development of a specialized 
system for the exploitation of resources 
varying from the high seas rights men-
tioned a moment ago is predicated on 
the assumption that a regime that vests 
an exclusive right to the resources only 
after they are extracted is not reflective 
of the economic needs of the exploiter 
of mineral resources. Quite frankly, it is 
also predicated on the assumption that a 
system should be devised which will 
permit all nations to share in the ocean's 
wealth-either directly or indirectly. 
There are at present many possible 
regimes under consideration. They 
generally fall into the following cate-
gories: 
First, the Flag state proposal: Under 
this system the nation would assume 
responsibility over an exploitative 
operation as if it were conducted on a 
vessel of its registry. The state of the 
exploiter would have a protective inter-
est in the resource to be exploited 
within a reasonable area. 
Secondly, an International registry: 
Under the system an international 
agency would register a national claim 
with some authority regarding com-
peting claims, thus validating the state's 
claim. 
Thirdly, complete Internationaliza-
tion: Under this system an international 
agency would "own" the resources of 
the seabed of the deep oceans. In effect, 
permission from the agency would be 
necessary before any exploitation took 
place. 
A combination of these alternatives 
is also possible. For example, some form 
of international registry of claims in 
conjunction with a system of flag state 
jurisdiction and control deserves serious 
consideration. From the national 
security standpoint, such a system 
might even be advantageous for it might 
tend to reduce the risk of economic 
conflict or territorial claims and, at the 
same time, not materially interfere with 
or constrain peacetime military activi-
ties and deployments. 
The final choice of the most favor-
able deep ocean regime alternative has 
not been made in SADOF or other 
national forums. As with the question 
of a precise outer boundary for the 
Continental Shelf, much work remains 
before the solution most beneficial to 
our composite national interest is 
found. In the course of this work, 
however, one underlying fact stands 
out-the oceans are becoming more, not 
less, essential to the security and well-
being of most, if not all, of the peoples 
of the world. And this fact alone dic-
tates that we should be more, not less, 
deliberate at arriving at irreversible de-
cisions. 
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